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The Australian federal election cycle, which occurs approximately every 3 years, causes much 
media attention and invokes indecision regarding investment decisions in both the real economy 
and financial markets. This paper constructs measures of political uncertainty and formally 
explores their relationship with market uncertainty, as measured by implied volatility. The 
empirical evidence suggests that increasing (decreasing) levels of uncertainty around the election 
result induce higher (lower) levels of market uncertainty.  In a case of the market preferring the 
devil it knows, an increasing (decreasing) likelihood of the incumbent party, whose economic 
policies are well-known, winning the election, reduces market uncertainty. The results remain 
significant even after controlling for a number of macroeconomic variables. 
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‘Nothing is but what is not’ – William Shakespeare (1605) 
1. Introduction 
The September 2013 federal elections in Australia brought to an end months of media 
commentary and speculation as to the likely winner, and the prospective future direction of fiscal 
and economic policy should a particular party win. Existing literature indicates that such political 
factors influence both the returns and risk levels of financial assets. Hibbs (1986) suggests that 
economic policies are conditioned by political forces, and party differences in policy have the 
potential to move the economy along different time paths and manifest in different returns to 
both stock- and bond-holders. Julio and Yook (2012) provide evidence connecting political 
uncertainty to changes in fundamentals of the real economy as firms reduce expenditures during 
times of political uncertainty.  
Prior studies have found substantial evidence for the influence of political outcomes on 
the stock market with the substantive finding that market uncertainty tends to rise as the election 
approaches and uncertainty about the result increases. Li and Born (2006) find that whilst the 
mean daily stock return rises in the 3-month period prior to U.S. elections when the outcome is 
uncertain, it is indistinguishable from the non-election period when the incumbent party is 
assured of re-election. Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) utilize data from the Iowa Electronic Market, 
a betting market for the U.S. Presidential election, and find support for the political uncertainty 
hypothesis which presumes that information regarding the probability of a particular election 
winner reflects information about future macroeconomic policy.  
Three studies have attempted to form an international perspective on the political 
uncertainty-market uncertainty relationship: Gemmill (1992) discovers a close relationship 
between U.K. polling and the FTSE Stock Index, with some evidence of ill-informed option 
speculators creating a bubble in the week prior to the election. Pantzalis et al. (2000) report that 
the connection between political uncertainty and the stock market differs in countries of varying 
political, economic and press freedom. Bialkowski et al. (2008) investigate a sample of 27 OECD 
countries and find that investors are often surprised by the election outcome with stock market 
return variance doubling during the week around the election. Importantly, the margin of victory 
and changes in political orientation of government are key factors in explaining the magnitude of 
the election shock. 
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 In terms of the impact that elections have on the macro-economy of a nation, this study 
fits within the more general field of research into the impact of news announcements and their 
effect on market uncertainty and implied volatility. The general result is that an upcoming 
scheduled news event induces an increase in market uncertainty that quickly dissipates once the 
announcement is made. Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004), Ederington and Lee (1996) and Smales 
(2013) report a rise in the volatility of financial asset prices as an approaching macroeconomic 
announcement creates uncertainty and then falls quickly when the data is released.  
Vähämaa, Watzka and Äijö (2005) investigate how option-implied return distributions 
change in bond futures in-light of macroeconomic news announcements, and report that 
expected volatility increases in response to higher than expected inflation and unemployment 
announcements. Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004), Chen and Clements (2007) and Vähämaa and 
Äijö (2011) examine the behaviour of implied volatility around FOMC monetary policy decisions 
and document that, having risen prior, implied volatility falls following the decision as 
uncertainty is resolved. Donders and Vorst (1996) utilize a similar methodology to examine the 
implied volatility behaviour of call options around scheduled firm-specific news announcements 
and report a substantial increase in implied volatility in the pre-event period and a sharp drop 
after the news release. To-date, there has been little empirical work concerning implied volatility 
indices in the Australian context. However, Frijns et al. (2010) construct an implied volatility 
index for the Australian equity market and observe a significant and asymmetric relationship 
between the volatility index and stock returns; echoing prior findings in U.S. markets. 
 French and Porteba (1991) note that investors have a significant home bias and 
predominantly hold domestic assets, thus they will have a significant amount of country-specific 
political risk within their portfolios. For such risk-averse investors it is essential to gain a full and 
proper understanding of the relationship between political uncertainty and market uncertainty. 
This paper asks a single key question: does political uncertainty impact market uncertainty? 
Relating this question to prior research, two hypotheses are formulated.  
H1: Consistent with Goodell and Vähämaa (2013), an increase (decrease) in political 
uncertainty will lead to an increase (decrease) in market uncertainty as measured by 
implied volatility – i.e. there is a positive relationship. 
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H2: In-line with extant literature suggesting that financial market uncertainty ensues 
from macroeconomic uncertainty; familiarity with the economic policies of the 
incumbent party, particularly one that is business friendly, will result in market 
uncertainty falling (rising) as the likelihood of the incumbent party winning the election 
increases (decreases) – i.e. there is a negative relationship. 
Whilst the empirical framework is essentially taken from Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) 
this paper still succeeds in making several contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, in 
contrast to Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) who assume the outcome of the election is known a 
priori, I use polling data to construct unique measures of ex-ante political uncertainty. Secondly, 
prior work has focused heavily on equity markets and ignored bond markets yet it is likely that a 
change in government would also have an impact on bond yields, particularly through fiscal 
policy, and therefore this study attempts to rectify that prior omission. Finally, by extending the 
existing work to an Australian dataset the results are placed in the context of an electoral system 
that has very different characteristics in so far as there exists variable timing1 of federal elections 
and where voting is also compulsory. 
 The empirical findings establish a clear relationship between Australian financial market 
uncertainty, as measured by implied volatility, and political uncertainty around federal election 
polling. In particular, the implied volatility of both equity and bond options increases in line with 
election uncertainty around the outcome of the poll result. The likelihood of the incumbent 
remaining in power reduces market uncertainty; consistent with the market preferring 
incumbents where economic policy is known, i.e. preferring the devil it knows, and a particular 
preference for parties which are viewed as more sympathetic towards business. The results are 
significant even after controlling for macroeconomic variables and the possibility that economic 
conditions may affect voting intentions. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The second section provides background 
information on the nature of Australian federal elections and also describes the election, financial 
and macroeconomic data used in the empirical analysis. The third section presents methodology 
and reports the empirical findings on the role of political uncertainty in the uncertainty of equity 
                                                             
1 The election can be held a maximum of 3-years after the Parliament sits following the prior election. 
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and bond markets. Finally, section four provides concluding remarks and suggestions for future 
research. 
2. Data 
2.1 Election Uncertainty in Australian Federal Polls 
The Australian Parliament was established in 1901 and voting is compulsory, with the use 
of transferable proportional voting to elect the Senate (the upper house). However, it is the 
federal elections for the House of Representatives (the lower house) that are of most interest 
during this study as outcome forms the basis for Government; a full-preference instant runoff 
voting system is used in which voters number the candidates on the ballot paper in the order of 
their preference2. House elections take place at least every 3 years, with the 2010 election 
resulting in the first hung parliament since 1940, and the most recent election (September 2013) 
witnessing a change in government.  
Whilst the Australian political system consists of many political parties, only two have a 
realistic chance of winning representation in the House and forming a government. As such, 
there is a de facto two-party system with the Australian Labor Party (ALP) the socialist (left) end 
of the political spectrum and the Liberal-National Party (L-NP) Coalition3 espousing more 
conservative (right) views. Traditionally, the ALP has had a predilection for fiscally expansionary 
policy that favours workers and unions, while the L-NP has in general favoured smaller 
government and policy that favours business. At the most basic level the differences between 
Australian political parties are analogous in many ways to that between the Democratic (Labour) 
Party and the Republican (Conservative) Party in the U.S. (U.K.). 
In the eight federal elections held in Australia since 1993, the stock market has risen by 
an average of 2.2% in the month prior to a L-NP election win, and fallen by 0.9% in the month 
prior to an ALP win. In the month subsequent to the election result, the stock market has rallied 
by 2.2% on average regardless of the winner. Once election uncertainty is resolved on polling 
day, volatility measures fall by 24.9% (13.7%) following L-NP (ALP) success. This suggests that 
the stock market rises (falls) in anticipation of business friendly (unfriendly) policies by the L-NP 
(ALP) and then continues to rise as uncertainty about the election and subsequent policies is 
                                                             
2 See www.aec.gov.au for more detailed information. 
3 Officially, the Coalition consists of the Liberal Party of Australia, the National Party of Australia, the Liberal National 
Party and the Country Liberal Party. 
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resolved. The reaction to electoral results is somewhat different in the bond markets. Yields on 5-
year government bonds rise by 3.7% (9.3%) on average following L-NP (ALP) poll wins, and the 
change in yields in more pronounced when comparing to changes in U.S. yields over the same 
time period; Australian yields rise by 10% (1.2%) more than comparative U.S. yields in the month 
prior to an ALP (L-NP) win and while yields continue to rise relative to those in the U.S. in the 
aftermath of an ALP win, they actually fall (by 4.0% on a relative basis) following a L-NP win. 
Likely, this result owes much to the market reflecting differences in economic policy inherent 
within the two parties, and in particular the expansionary fiscal policy generally pursued by the 
ALP.  
 The two-party preferred vote (2PP) is the result of an election or opinion poll after 
preferences have been distributed to the two major parties. Owing to the nature of the Australian 
electoral system, the two-party preferred vote data collected by polling companies is of particular 
interest when seeking to determine the likely winner of forthcoming elections. This study utilizes 
federal voting intention data expressed as a two-party preferred vote provided by Roy Morgan 
Research; a leading independent polling company4. Figure 1 – Panel A depicts how the ALP and 
L-NP have performed in the opinion polls for the four Federal elections in the 2000 – 2013 time-
frame on the basis of 2PP polling. 
 In this study, the release of the poll is defined as the date on which it could begin to 
influence financial market returns. For example, if a poll is released on a Sunday then the next 
trading day is taken to be the poll date. For each election year, I examine polls for the calendar 
year prior to polling day; since polls are generally released on a fortnightly basis this will give a 
base sample of 26 fortnightly releases of polling data, to which is added additional weekly polls 
that take place in the period immediately prior to the election data5. IUn,t, a measure of Australian 
federal election uncertainty is constructed, where n refers to the election year and t refers to the 
time until the election date. The 2PP opinion poll result for the party out of power, On,t, is 
subtracted from the 2PP result for the party of the incumbent Prime Minister, In,t. The difference 
is then divided by the poll’s sampling error (σn,t): 
                                                             
4 Roy Morgan Research was founded in 1941 and as well as being the longest established public opinion 
polling company in Australia, is independent from ownership by any media companies, and it’s opinion 
polls were most accurate in forecasting the outcome of the Australian federal elections during the time-
frame considered in this study. 
5 To ensure consistency of the polling data I exclude telephone-based polls from the sample owing to their 
well-documented selection bias. 
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               (1) 
 Following Goodell and Vähämaa (2013), EUn,t is introduced as a second measure of 
election uncertainty. EUn,t captures the difference between the probability of re-election of the 
incumbent party, and the probability of the other party winning the election. EUn,t is defined: 
                 (2) 
Where PIn,t denotes the probability of success of the incumbent party. When both parties 
have an equal probability to become elected (i.e. PIn,t = 0.5) then EUn,t equals one. When either of 
the parties is certain to win the election (i.e. PIn,t  = 0 or 1) then EUn,t equals zero. The test 
variables utilised within the empirical analysis are %∆IUn,t and %∆EUn,t – the percentage change 
in the respective measures of electoral uncertainty. 
2.2 Financial Instruments and Macroeconomic Data 
 The financial instruments utilized within the empirical analysis are exchange-traded 
futures and options contracts based on the S&P/ASX 200 (the leading benchmark for Australia’s 
equity markets) and the 3-year Treasury Bond (the most actively traded Australian bond futures 
contract). Daily closing data is collected from Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH), provided 
by SIRCA6, and the Australian Securities Exchange7. To ensure that the study concentrates on the 
most liquid contracts only the nearest futures contracts are considered. In-line with market 
convention, the contract under consideration is rolled on the last day of the month preceding the 
delivery month.  
A measure of implied volatility is constructed using the daily closing levels of ATM call 
and put options; the closing implied volatility level of the two nearest to expiry option contracts 
are interpolated in order to ensure a constant option maturity of 30 days. This produces a 
measure, , that represents the expected volatility of the S&P/ASX 200 (SPX) over the next 
30-days, and is similar in fashion to the widely used CBOE VIX index. Similarly,  represents 
the expected volatility of 3-yr Treasury bond futures over the same period. Figure 1 – Panel B8 
depicts how each measure moves over time in the period around the four elections considered in 
                                                             
6 Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific 
7 www.asx.com.au 
8 Note that since the implied volatility measure is general much lower for bonds than for equity markets, 
the measures are re-scaled in order to provide clarity of the evolution of each measure over time. 
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this article. Note the spike in equity market volatility around the events of September 2001, and 
the apparent positive relationship between volatility and the 2PP for the ALP. 
<Insert Figure 1> 
Since option implied volatility incorporates all available information that is relevant for 
forming expectations about future volatility, implied volatility is widely considered as the best 
estimate of market uncertainty.  In this study, the variables of interest are  and , 
the percentage change in the implied volatility level of the S&P/ASX 200 Index options and 3-
year Treasury Bond options respectively.  
 Changes in economic optimism and changes in expectations regarding macroeconomic 
risk will likely impact voting preferences, financial asset prices and market sentiment; therefore, a 
number of macroeconomic variables are included as control variables. %∆INFL is the percentage 
change in inflation as reported by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Periods of increasing 
inflation are typically associated with increases in economic activity and more restrictive changes 
in monetary policy. %∆UNEMP is the monthly percentage change in unemployment reported by 
the ABS. %∆ASX is the percentage change in the S&P/ASX200 Index. %∆CONSCONF is the 
monthly percentage change in consumer confidence as reported by Westpac / Melbourne 
Institute, and it would be expected that rising consumer confidence would follow from rising 
stock markets and falling unemployment. %∆RBACR is the percentage change in the official cash 
target rate of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA); this measure is included since it is the main 
instrument of monetary policy and influences many facets of economic activity. %∆AUDTWI is 
the percentage change in the trade-weighted-index of the Australian dollar. Finally, the change in 
slope of the yield curve9, ∆3s10s, is included since this provides information on market 
expectations of future economic activity and future changes in interest rates.  
<Insert Table I> 
Table I provides summary statistics for all of the variables used within the empirical 
analysis. The table shows that the mean and standard deviation for both implied volatility 
measures was highest in the period prior to the 2007 federal election; notably this was the 
incumbent L-NP lost at the polls. The mean values of the measures of political uncertainty are 
relatively minor but exhibit a relatively large standard deviation; %∆IUn,t was highest prior to the 
                                                             
9 Yield curve slope is measured as the difference between the yields on 3- and 10-yr Treasury Bonds.  
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2004 election and %∆EUn,t highest prior to the 2010 election. Clearly, %∆INFL has been the most 
volatile macroeconomic variable over the period considered, although it is interesting to note that 
this measure was generally declining whilst L-NP was the incumbent party and was increasing 
prior to the 2010 election when the ALP was incumbent. 
Table II provides the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables used in the 
regression analysis of this paper. Note the negative correlation between %∆IUn,t and implied 
volatility measures, and the positive correlation between %∆EUn,t and implied volatility measures; 
implied volatility declines as the incumbent becomes more likely to win since market participants 
have a greater understanding of the economic policies of the incumbent, while implied volatility 
increases as election uncertainty increases. Unsurprisingly, there is a positive relationship 
between the implied volatility measures for equity and bond markets. In-line with the findings of 
Whaley (2009) there is a significantly negative relationship between %∆ASX and implied 
volatility, that is implied volatility rises as the stock market declines and vice-versa. The 
correlation between the macroeconomic variables makes intuitive sense as rising (falling) interest 
rates (RBACR) would likely be commensurate with rising (falling) inflation, falling (rising) 
unemployment, rising (falling) consumer confidence, and a rising (falling) Australian Dollar. 
<Insert Table II> 
3.  Empirical Results 
3.1   Implied Volatility and Political Uncertainty 
The first stage in the empirical analysis of the role that political uncertainty plays in 
influencing implied volatility, and hence market uncertainty, is to perform a regression of the 
form: 
                 (3) 
 Where  is the percentage change in implied volatility of instrument i (that is 
S&P/ASX 200 or the 3-yr government bond),  is the percentage change in the likelihood 
of the incumbent party winning the election,  is the percentage change in election 
uncertainty,  are control variables for election fixed effects, and  is the error term. 
A one-period lagged percentage change in implied volatility is included since the volatility of the 
financial instruments considered is mean-reverting.  
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<Insert Table III> 
Table III reports the results for the regression presented in Eq. (3), a disaggregation of the 
model into each of the election periods considered is also presented in order to allow for analysis 
of how the relationship has evolved over time. In consideration of the aggregate panel models, for 
the fixed effect specification makes it clear that the level of implied volatility decreases as the 
probability of the incumbent winning increases although this is only significant for equity 
options, providing evidence that uncertainty is lower when the prospective economic policy of 
election winners is known to the market; if the likelihood of the incumbent winning increases by 
1% then implied volatility decreases by approximately 0.5%. Election uncertainty has a significant 
positive effect on the implied volatility of both equity and bond option markets although the 
magnitude of the effect is greatest for SPX options; a 1% increase in election uncertainty results in 
a 0.8% increase in SPX implied volatility and a 0.16% increase in 3-yr bond option implied 
volatility. Upon consideration of the disaggregated model, the influence of election uncertainty 
on implied volatility is apparently declining over time for both equity and bond options. 
Given the historical performance of Australian financial markets in the proximity of 
federal elections conditional on different parties winning, it is possible that changes in implied 
volatility may differ dependent on the polling performance of a preferred party. A second 
equation is introduced: 
 
Where  is an interaction term between percentage changes incumbent 
uncertainty and L-NP polling performance and the other variables are defined as for Eq. (3). The 
results for Eq. (4) are presented in Table IV. Election uncertainty has a significant positive impact 
on both measures of implied volatility; that is implied volatility increases when election 
uncertainty rises. Additionally, the lagged implied volatility term is significantly negative in a 
confirmation of mean reversion. Interestingly, %∆IU is no longer significant, or negative, as 
before however the interaction term with change in L-NP polling performance is both significant 
and positive. This result suggests that market uncertainty is actually responding to changes in the 
likelihood that the L-NP Coalition will be elected rather than changes in re-election of the 
incumbent regardless of party affiliation.  
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<Insert Table IV> 
3.2  The influence of macroeconomic factors 
It is possible that macroeconomic factors also have a significant influence on market 
uncertainty and the implied volatility of exchange traded options. Macroeconomic variables are 
introduced into the model specification in order to examine whether the impact of political 
uncertainty remains when controlling for economic conditions. A model is specified as follows: 
 
The regression results for Eq. (5) are reported in Table V. Election uncertainty appears to 
have a positive and significant relationship with market uncertainty, even after controlling for 
economic variables, although this relationship is much stronger for equity options. With Model 3, 
a 1% increase in election uncertainty induces a 0.58% increase in SPX option volatility, and only 
a 0.4% increase in bond option volatility. The likelihood of incumbents been re-elected does not 
have a significant relationship, but the interaction term with L-NP polling is negative and well-
defined for SPX options; that is, an increase in the likelihood of a L-NP incumbent been re-
elected decreases stock market uncertainty. 
Note the substantial increase in explanatory power, R2, as a consequence of including the 
macroeconomic variables. In particular, stock market returns appear to have a large impact on 
implied volatility. The percentage change in implied volatility of both instruments has a highly 
significant and negative relationship with changes in the S&P/ASX 200 Index, i.e. implied 
volatility falls as the stock market rises; a 1% rise in the stock market results in a 4.07% fall in the 
implied volatility of SPX options and a 0.59% fall in the implied volatility of 3-yr bond options. 
Changes in inflation are also found to have a negative relationship with implied volatility and two 
related explanations exist for this: Firstly, falling inflation will decrease the probability of rate 
increases by the RBA and hence be positive for asset prices. Secondly, subdued inflation may 
evidence sound economic management by the incumbent government which will increase the 
possibility of re-election and hence reduce political and economic uncertainty. Given the close 
relationship between inflation and interest rate movements it is perhaps surprising that the 
coefficients for the implied volatility of bond options are not well defined. The lagged implied 
volatility variable remains significant and negative. 
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<Insert Table V> 
As discussed earlier, it is likely that economic conditions will exert an influence on voting 
behaviour and so, in a similar vein to Goodell and Vähämaa (2013), an orthogonalization 
procedure is utilized to mitigate concerns related to jointly determined independent variables. 
Changes in election uncertainty, %∆EU, are regressed on lagged control variables that measure 
changes in macroeconomic factors: 
 
The residual term,  of Eq. (6) measures the component of %∆UE that is uncorrelated 
with the macroeconomic variables. The residuals are employed to isolate the effects of federal 
elections, from changes in economic conditions, on implied market volatility. %∆EURESID is 
defined as the residual of Eq. (6) and is utilized in a regression specification where percentage 
changes in implied volatility are regressed on macroeconomic variables: 
 
Table VI reports the estimates of the regression specified in Eq. (7). In both cases the 
coefficient estimates for %∆EURESID are positive and statistically significant. These estimates 
demonstrate that implied volatility increases as election uncertainty increases, and also indicate 
that the positive association between market uncertainty and political uncertainty cannot be 
attributed to changes in macroeconomic conditions prompting a reaction in both election polling 
and implied volatility. The highly significant and negative relationship between stock market 
returns and implied volatility remains, as does the negative relationship between inflation and 
implied volatility. Finally, the mean reversion of volatility is again evident in the lagged implied 
volatility variable. 
<Insert Table VI> 
In summary, consistent with Li and Born (2006) and Bialkowski et al. (2008), the 
empirical analysis provides strong evidence that election uncertainty has a significant impact on 
market uncertainty. In addition, the results are analogous to the more general finding of prior 
work such that important scheduled news events create market uncertainty which is only 
resolved when the outcome is known. Consistent with hypothesis H1, the election uncertainty 
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measure defined here exhibits a significant and positive relationship with implied volatility. The 
likelihood of the incumbent remaining in power reduces implied volatility, although this is 
primarily driven by the interaction with the likelihood of L-NP Coalition winning the election. 
This is consistent with Hypothesis H2 such that the market prefers incumbents where economic 
policy is known, and a particular preference for the L-NP which is often viewed as more 
sympathetic towards business. The introduction of macroeconomic control variables greatly 
increases the explanatory power of the expression, and in particular there is evidence of a 
significant negative relationship between stock market returns and implied volatility. However, 
even after controlling for macroeconomic variables and the possibility that economic conditions 
effect voting intentions, election uncertainty remains a significant factor in determining market 
uncertainty in both equity and bond markets. 
4.  Conclusion 
This study examines the effects of political uncertainty on implied volatility, and by 
implication market uncertainty, during Australian federal election cycles. Utilizing polling data 
from Roy Morgan Research, empirical measures of political uncertainty are constructed over five 
Australian election cycles between 2001 and 2013 in order to test two hypotheses. 
The empirical results indicate that Australian federal election uncertainty has a significant 
impact on market uncertainty. In particular, the implied volatility of both equity and bond 
options increases in line with election uncertainty around the outcome of the poll result, while, in 
a case of better the devil you know, market uncertainty falls as the likelihood of the incumbent 
winning rises, this is especially so if the L-NP is incumbent. The results are robust to the inclusion 
of macroeconomic control variables, and are consistent with the notion that the Australian 
federal election process may result in fluctuating levels of uncertainty among market participants 
as they revise their expectations regarding the future direction of economic policy. The results are 
consistent with those reported by Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) for the U.S. Presidential election 
and suggest that the influence of election uncertainty is not dependent on the electoral system in 
place.  
With polling regularity and political scrutiny increasing during the period surrounding 
elections, the results presented in this article provide strong evidence that market participants are 
likely to be effected by the level of political uncertainty. One policy implication that arises from 
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the results in this paper would be that political parties may reduce uncertainty in financial 
markets by flagging their economic policies well in advance; of course, this would not make a 
difference if market participants did not believe such polices would actually be implemented or 
sustained in the event of an election win. 
One possible area of further research would be to develop specific trading strategies that 
would allow market participants to benefit (or at least undertake transactions to protect capital) 
from changes in political uncertainty around the forthcoming federal election and future 
elections, particularly those investors who have exposure to volatility risk. Evidence of interest in 
implied volatility trading and investment profitability may also lead to the Australian Securities 
Exchange instituting a tradeable contract similar to that found in Chicago (CBOE). Another area 
of work in this fascinating area would be to utilize information from betting markets, for instance 
Rhode and Stumpf (2004) report that such markets did a remarkable job in an era prior to 
scientific polling and still offer several advantages in terms of aggregating information, and 
betting markets formed the basis of Goodell and Vähämaa (2013); however, betmatrix10 publish an 
hourly election market that may be utilised to understand the dynamics of election and market 
uncertainty at a higher frequency. Finally, it would be of interest to study the impact of political 
uncertainty on specific stocks which may be more impacted by the election outcome; for instance, 
Australian mining companies may be subject to differing taxation regimes dependent on the 
polling result.  
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Figure	1
Panel A: Polling results - 2 party preferred polling for Australian federal election
































































Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
%∆σSPX 0.10 22.97 -0.44 11.43 2.13 12.67 -0.30 12.11 -2.06 16.10 -0.16 13.23
%∆σ3YB 1.07 4.14 -0.59 8.97 1.37 9.41 -0.97 5.20 0.22 8.00 0.10 7.56
%∆IU 0.21 7.90 0.28 3.85 0.02 7.25 -0.17 4.87 0.32 8.79 0.08 6.06
%∆EU 0.41 5.84 -0.03 3.34 0.02 7.25 0.44 6.50 -0.22 4.10 0.21 5.84
%∆INFL 0.27 1.53 -0.07 0.38 -0.44 0.26 0.16 0.75 0.14 0.38 -0.02 0.73
%∆UNEMP 0.36 2.12 -0.69 2.69 -0.78 2.22 -0.98 1.92 0.55 2.43 -0.52 2.24
%∆ASX 0.18 2.81 0.43 1.36 0.60 2.20 0.28 3.20 0.58 2.23 0.37 2.39
%∆CONSCONF -0.75 6.08 0.14 2.63 -0.38 5.37 1.32 5.60 -0.19 4.43 0.08 4.92
%∆RBACR -1.27 2.37 0.32 1.40 0.40 1.19 1.31 3.32 -1.01 2.26 0.19 2.07
%∆AUDTWI 0.18 2.19 0.22 1.63 0.24 1.87 0.22 1.92 -0.33 1.58 0.22 1.90
∆3s10s 0.04 0.19 -0.17 0.12 -0.03 0.16 -0.07 0.19 0.06 0.20 -0.06 0.16
Number of obs. 0.33 1.65
Note:  This table presents summary statistics for the data used in the empirical analysis of this paper. Variables include the percentage change of implied 
volatility of SPX equity options and 3-yr government bond options. In addition, the percentage change in measures of political uncertainty (IU and EU ) and a 
range of macroeconomic control variables including inflation, unemployment, consumer confidence, the RBA cash rate, and the AUD trade-weighted index 
are included. 
TABLE	I
Summary Statistics for implied volatility, political and macroeconomic variables
29 32 31 32 124
2001 Election 2004 Election 2007 Election 2010 Election Overall2013 Election
%∆σSPX %∆σ3YB %∆IU %∆EU %∆INFL %∆UNEMP %∆ASX %∆RBACR %∆CONSCONF %∆AUDTWI
%∆σ3YB 0.273
%∆IU -0.134 -0.073
%∆EU 0.240 0.030 0.207
%∆INFL -0.091 -0.101 0.081 0.028
%∆UNEMP 0.034 -0.122 -0.067 -0.001 -0.136
%∆ASX -0.779 -0.222 0.145 -0.252 -0.045 -0.027
%∆RBACR 0.123 -0.028 -0.079 -0.020 0.376 -0.103 -0.129
%∆CONSCONF 0.077 -0.011 0.083 0.083 0.160 -0.165 0.129 0.146
%∆AUDTWI 0.168 0.024 0.008 0.082 0.145 -0.042 -0.114 0.022 0.302
∆3s10s 0.320 0.033 -0.202 0.207 -0.093 -0.007 -0.291 0.092 -0.150 -0.042
TABLE	II
Correlations for implied volatility, political and macroeconomic variables
Note:  This table reports the cross-correlations for the variables included within the empirical anaysis of this paper. Variables include the 
percentage change of implied volatility of SPX equity options and 3-yr government bond options. In addition, the percentage change in 
measures of political uncertainty (IU and EU) and a range of macroeconomic control variables including inflation, unemployment, consumer 
confidence, the RBA cash rate, and the AUD trade-weighted index are included.
Variable 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 Model 1 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 Model 1
Constant 0.127 -1.140 1.737 -0.575 -2.091 0.246 0.389 -0.568 1.387 -0.948 0.347 0.054
(3.722) (1.487) (2.142) (2.321) (2.749) (1.336) (0.486) (1.301) (1.507) (0.979) (1.383) (0.611)
%∆IU -1.220** -1.808* -0.248 -0.047 -0.041 -0.528** -0.045 -0.003 -0.010 -0.319 -0.312 -0.131
(0.586) (1.032) (0.332) (1.731) (0.544) (0.241) (0.074) (0.847) (0.257) (0.750) (0.268) (0.130)
%∆EU 2.122** 1.102** 0.252* 0.602** 1.533** 0.832*** 0.715*** 0.445** 0.322** 0.186* 0.564* 0.158**
(0.830) (0.502) (0.148) (0.242) (0.709) (0.255) (0.140) (0.197) (0.156) (0.106) (0.308) (0.074)
AR(1) -0.200* -0.299* -0.096* -0.084 -0.188 -0.045*** -0.592** -0.229* -0.182* 0.004 0.002 -0.227**
(0.108) (0.173) (0.049) (0.199) (0.181) (0.010) (0.265) (0.127) (0.106) (0.179) (0.175) (0.098)
Fixed or random - - - - - Fixed - - - - - Fixed
adj. R2 0.293 0.214 0.209 0.115 0.138 0.186 0.740 0.212 0.132 0.019 0.082 0.082
F-Stat 2.904 2.393 1.902 1.218 2.603 2.547 10.433 1.178 0.452 0.087 1.483 1.483
No. Obs 29 32 31 32 32 156 26 32 31 32 32 153
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
TABLE	III
Base regression: Influence of political uncertainty on market uncertainty
%∆σ SPX %∆σ 3YB
Note: This table presents results from the base regression set out in Eq. (3) whereby the percentage change in implied volatility of SPX equity options, 
and 3-yr bond options, are regressed on the percentage change in the two identified political uncertainty variables (Incumbent Uncertainty, IU, and 
Election Uncertainty, EU) as well as one-lagged term of the dependent variable. A simple linear OLS is used to disaggregate into individual election 
cycles, while a panel based model (with fixed time effects) is utilized to analyze the overall effect. Standard errors reported in parentheses.











Fixed or random Fixed Fixed
adj. R2 0.250 0.085
F-Stat 2.727 1.923
DW 2.084 2.135
No. Obs 156 153
Regression: Influence of political party of incumbent 
Prime Minister
TABLE	IV
Note: This table presents results from the regression set 
out in Eq. (4) whereby the percentage change in implied 
volatility of SPX equity options, and 3-yr bond options, are 
regressed on the percentage change in the three identified 
political uncertainty variables (Incumbent Uncertainty, 
IU, and Election Uncertainty, EU, and an interaction term 
between Incumbent Uncertainty and the incumbent 
Prime Minisiter been a member of the LNP Coalition) as 
well as one-lagged term of the dependent variable. A fixed 
time effects panel specification is used. Standard errors in 
parentheses.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant 1.320 1.215 1.182 0.171 0.165 0.157
(0.826) (0.825) (0.802) (0.717) (0.718) (0.726)
%∆IU 0.184 0.863* -0.090 -0.049
(0.392) (0.487) (0.325) (0.412)
%∆EU 1.227*** 0.575** 0.051** 0.036**
(0.161) (0.252) (0.022) (0.018)
%∆IU·LNP -1.132*** -1.160** 0.030 -0.031
(0.429) (0.518) (0.362) (0.522)
%∆INFL -0.076** -0.077** -0.067** -0.021* -0.023* -0.020*
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011)
%∆UNEMP 0.112 0.124 0.096 -0.108 -0.103 -0.110
(0.165) (0.163) (0.161) (0.137) (0.136) (0.138)
%∆ASX -4.269*** -4.163*** -4.066*** -0.604** -0.617** -0.590**
(0.331) (0.331) (0.336) (0.280) (0.283) (0.294)
%∆RBACR 0.038 0.093 0.111 0.009 0.012 0.014
(0.329) (0.327) (0.320) (0.282) (0.282) (0.285)
%∆CONSCONF -0.032 -0.045 0.040 -0.007 -0.012 -0.003
(0.179) (0.176) (0.177) (0.148) (0.144) (0.151)
%∆AUDTWI 0.383 0.323 0.317 -0.035 -0.028 -0.039
(0.326) (0.325) (0.318) (0.271) (0.270) (0.273)
∆3s10s 15.637 13.051 11.953 -2.481 -1.906 -2.721
(11.454) (11.253) (11.305) (9.484) (9.421) (9.646)
AR(1) -0.144 -0.133** -0.258** -0.222** -0.221** -0.222**
(0.100) (0.069) (0.102) (0.105) (0.103) (0.105)
Fixed/Random Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
adj. R2 0.668 0.672 0.684 0.138 0.135 0.138
F-Stat 15.574 17.646 15.601 2.131 2.724 2.919
No. Obs 148 148 148 138 138 138
%∆σ SPX %∆σ 3YB
Regression: The influence of macroeconomic variables and political uncertainty on implied volatility
TABLE	V
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Note:  This table presents results from the regression set out in Eq. (5) whereby the percentage change in implied 
volatility of SPX equity options, and 3-yr bond options, are regressed on the percentage change in the three identified 
political uncertainty variables (Incumbent Uncertainty, IU, and Election Uncertainty, EU, and an interaction term 
between Incumbent Uncertainty and the incumbent Prime Minister been a member of the LNP Coalition), one-lagged 
term of the dependent variable, and on a number of control variables for macroeconomic variables. Economic variables 
are the percentage change in inflation ( INFL ), unemployment (UNEMP ), the stock market (ASX ), the RBA cash rate 
(RBACR ), consumer confidence (CONSCONF ), and A$ trade weighted index (AUDTWI ). The change in the level of 
the yield curve slope measure by the difference between 10-yr and 3-yr government bond yields is also included 
(3s10s ). A fixed time effects panel specification is used. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Variable %∆σ SPX %∆σ 3YB
%∆IU 0.073 0.172
(0.373) (0.226)
%∆EU 0.832 *** 0.174 ***
(0.253) (0.056)



















Number of instruments 11 11
J-Statistic 0.038 0.126
Robustness check: Dynamic panel estimator controlling for 
orthogonalized deviations
TABLE	VI
Note:  This table presents results from the dynamic panel estimator 
(SGMM) described in Section 3.3. Change in implied volatility of 
SPX equity options, and 3-yr bond options, are regressed on the 
percentage change in the three identified political uncertainty 
variables (Incumbent Uncertainty, IU , and Election Uncertainty, 
EU , and an interaction term between Incumbent Uncertainty and 
the incumbent Prime Minister been a member of the LNP Coalition), 
one-lagged term of the dependent variable, and on a number of 
control variables for macroeconomic variables. Economic variables 
are the percentage change in inflation ( INFL ), unemployment 
(UNEMP ), the stock market (ASX ), the RBA cash rate (RBACR ), 
consumer confidence (CONSCONF ), and A$ trade weighted index 
(AUDTWI ). The change in the level of the yield curve slope measure 
by the difference between 10-yr and 3-yr government bond yields is 
also included (3s10s ).  Standard errors are stated in parentheses.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.
Variable Ret_ASX Ret_ 3YBYield





%∆EU -0.042 ** -0.008 ***
(0.021) (0.002)




%∆RBACR -0.092 ** 1.148 ***
(0.047) (0.049)
%∆CONSCONF 0.042 ** 0.025
(0.021) (0.019)
%∆AUDTWI 0.497 *** 0.288 ***
(0.065) (0.056)
∆3s10s 1.391 *** 13.232 ***
(0.648) (0.677)
Panel B: Conditional Variance
Constant 2.700 *** 0.244 ***
(0.589) (0.074)
ARCH 0.188 ** 0.087 ***
(0.079) (0.189)
GARCH 0.410 *** 0.895 ***
(0.106) (0.017)
%∆IU -0.017 ** -0.032 **
(0.007) (0.013)
%∆EU 0.037 ** 0.065 **
(0.017) (0.031)
%∆INFL 3.279 22.926 ***
(37.075) (7.321)
%∆UNEMP 0.205 ** 0.071
(0.095) (0.045)
%∆RBACR 0.094 0.245 ***
(0.115) (0.064)
%∆CONSCONF -0.158 *** -0.053 **
(0.051) (0.024)
%∆AUDTWI -0.592 ** -0.196 **
(0.248) (0.086)
∆3s10s 0.821 -3.684 ***
(1.828) (1.025)
adj. R2 0.204 0.611
Log-Likelihood -1079.7 -1132.7
DW 2.077 2.419
No. Obs 148 138
Table	VII
Modelling influence of political uncertainty on volatility in a 
GARCH(1,1) framework
Note: This table presents results from the GARCH specification 
explained in Section 3.4. The dependent variables are the returns 
on the ASX stock index and yields on 3-year Australian 
government bonds. Independent variables are the percentage 
change in the identified political uncertainty variables 
(Incumbent Uncertainty, IU , and Election Uncertainty, EU ), and 
on a number of control variables for macroeconomic variables. 
Economic variables are the percentage change in inflation 
(INFL ), unemployment (UNEMP ), the stock market (ASX ), the 
RBA cash rate (RBACR ), consumer confidence (CONSCONF ), 
and A$ trade weighted index (AUDTWI ). The change in the 
level of the yield curve slope measure by the difference between 
10-yr and 3-yr government bond yields is also included (3s10s ). 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively.
